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Abstract 
 The modern problems of cryptography are stipulated by the necessity of mathematical apparatus development to model the 
system of information security, their comparative characteristics, analysis of their computation stability and mimic resistance. On 
the basis of polybasic algebraic system a formal model of the cryptosystem has been constructed. Within the framework of this  
model, main types of cryptosystems have been distinguished 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
   The systems of information security [1 – 3] are characterized by manifold and processes complexity of their 
interaction with external medium as well as the complexity of the external medium (containing intellectual 
components). Meanwhile the mathematical model of the cryptosystem plays a fundamental role. Approaches to the 
construction of such models from the positions of systems theorem [4] and modern algebra [5] are known. The first 
approach [1] is based on the system of input-output type.  
S = ( M , C , K1 , K2 , E , D ) , 
where M, C, K1 and K2 – set correspondingly clear texts, encrypted texts, encryption keys and decryption keys, and 
E : M × K1 → C и D : C × K2 → M – algorithms of encryption and decryption. The advantage of this model is 
introduction of coherence of the processes of encryption and decryption by bijection ݇ǣܭଵ ՜ ܭଶ, the opportunity of  
distinguishing block and flow cryptosystems as well as a range of ports through which passive attacks of a 
cryptoanalyst are realized. 
The second approach [6] is based on the algebraic system. 
ܵ ൌ ሺܶǡ ܨǡ ݀݋݉ܽ݅݊ǡ ݎܽ݊݃݁ǡ ܨ௘ǡ ܨ௖ሻ, 
where T and F – set of names correspondingly types and functions, domain : F → T* and range : F → T – mappings, 
Fe ( Fe ك F ) – set of easily computable function, and Fc = { fאF | domain ( f ) = λ } ( λ – an empty word) 
– constant set. The advantage of this model is the opportunity to construct the family of congruences on the system 
terms set, intended to form defining relations for the actual cryptosystem and distinguishing a range of ports, 
through which passive attacks of a cryptoanalyst is realized.    
However both models have essential disadvantages. Firstly, they can present systems with forestalling and systems, 
containing noncomputable functions. Secondly, their additional working out is necessary to distinguish the main 
classes of cryptosystems [1] and introduce main types of attacks of a cryptoanalyst. Thirdly, they don’t enable to 
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introduce parametric cryptosystems efficiently [7, 8], unstable cryptosystems and cryptosystems with encryption 
window oscillation. The essential way of avoiding these disadvantages is to choose algorithmic algebras as a basic 
model of the system option [9]. For this purpose it is necessary to construct the corresponding polybasic algebraic 
system. The solution of this problem is the main purpose of the given work. 
The structure of the work is the following: in p.1 main polybasic algebraic system has been constructed and 
characterized, in p.2 within the framework of this model main types of cryptosystems have been distinguished. The 
conclusion contains a range of inferences. 
.. 
 
2. Main algebraic system 
 
 
S = ( T , F ), 
where the family T of main set and signature F are given by 
(T = { Tij = { tijr ) | r   
F  U F   
It is assumed that sets Tij mutually, besides Ti2 is so linearly ordered, that 
ti1(1) < ti2(2)  tin(n)  
Sets T11 81 and T12 82 will be called sets of names and sets of sizes correspondingly clear texts, 
encryption keys, encryption parameters, encryption states, encrypted texts. 
 F, consisting of names of easily computable functions. 
I. The set U consists of names of steadily increasing functions and given by 
U = { ui(1) i(2) : N3 i(3) : N3  
where for all values i  at any fixed values y , z  N ( z < y ) function 
vi (x) = ui(2) and function wi ( x ) = ui(3) on the set 
i
(1) ( y ) }, and each of the functions vi , wi transforms this set to set i(1) ( z ) } . 
    The set U is intended to construct on each set Ti1Ti2 the system defining correlation as following 
 
 
 
 
where                                                                r = r1+ r2 ( r1 , r2 )  N , 
h1= ui(2) ( h , r , r1 ) , 
h2 = ui(3) ( h , r , r2 ) . 
The first of the correlations (1) realizes change from sets Ti1Ti2 to the set 
Ti,12 = { ti1(h) ti2(r) | r  N , h i(1) (r ) }}  Ti1Ti2 . 
 
Ti,12 ( n ) = { ti1 (h) ti2 (n) Ti,12 | h i(1) (n) }} ( n  N ) . 
Then 
 
 
 
where Ti,12 ( n ) ( n  N )  pairwise disjoint finite sets. The value of the second one of correlations (1) consists in 
the following. Correlations system (1) will be called semigroup, if each element ti1(h) ti2 (r)  Ti,12 
uniquely can be written in the form 
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Let X = { x1 m } ( m  N ) , ti2 (r) = r ( r  N ) and ui(1) (r ) = mr .  the bijection  : Ti,12 + by 
congruences 
 ( ti1 (h) ti2 (r) ) = x j1 jr i(1) (r ) ) ( r  N ) , 
where  h = jr + (j 2 1 r 1 . 
     In this case correlations (1) go with order by first difference on each set 
Ti,12 ( r ) ( r  N ). It turns out as following. 
Theorem 1. Semigroup system of defining correlations (1) is consistent. 
     Let s illustrate the advantages of semigroup system of defining correlations (1) as following simple example. 
     Sample 1. 1. Let 
X = {000 , 001 , 010 , 011 , 100 , 101 , 110 , 111} . 
              The first correlation (1) enables to present a message t11(21)  t12(2)  as the following 
 
t11(20)  t12 (1) = t11(12)  t12(1) = t11 (4)  t12 (1) )= 011. 
 
2. Let 
X = Z4 = {000 , 001 , 010 , 011} . 
 
 
          The second correlation (1) enables to present a message t11(12)  t12(2) as the following 
 
 
t11(21)  t12 (2) = t11(5)  t12(2) = t11 (2)  t12 (1) t11 (4)  t12 (1)= 001000. 
 
Everywhere else thereafter we will consider, that the system of defining correlations (1)  semigroup and equalities 
are  correct ui 
 
ui(1) = ui+4(1)   
 
II. The set F is given by 
 
F = F1  F2 , 
where F1 and F2  equipotent non-overlapping sets of functions names, complying with following three conditions. 
 
Condition 1. For each f j  F j (j = 1, 2) there are such numbers n (1) , n (2)   N , that  
 
 
 
where 
 
 
 
Condition 2.  For all f j F j ( j = 1, 2 ) and  (t , t )  T   ( n ) ( n  N ), 
f j ( t  , t  , t  , t4 j )  T9 4 j,12( n ) 
 
at all  (t  , t4 j )  T f j . 
 
Condition 3. For all  function 
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is the bijection of the set T  ( n ) ( n  N ) for the set T9  ( n ) at all fixed values (t  , t  , t4 j )  T4 j 
 f j . 
 
Let s call F1 a set of encryption scheme, and F2  set of decryption scheme. 
III. Set 
 = { 1 , 2 } 
Where consists of names of such bijections 
 j : F j  ( j = 1, 2 ) , 
that for all f j Fj ( j = 1, 2 ) equalities are  correct 
| pr1 T f j | = | pr1 T  j ( f j ) | , 
 
| pr2 T f j | = | pr2 T  j ( f j ) | , 
 
|T f j | = | T  j ( f j ) | , 
 
 
IV. Set 
 
 
 
consists of names of such bijections  
 
 
 
 
, 
 
  , 
 
 
that for all       and   equalities 
 
                (2) 
 
 
 
 
are correct at all   
 
Let s note that equalities (2) provide biunique correspondence between results of the processes of encryption and 
decryption. 
Now let s characterize the constructed algebraic system  . 
For all   and      equivalence relations 
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 . 
 
in the following way: 
 
 
 
          (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                (4) 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                         (5) 
 
From (2)  (5) follows 
Theorem 2. For all  : 
 
1) If  then    
2) If then  
3) If  then  
   : 
1) the class of loosely -minimal system  , characterized by the fact that for any two elements   
at any    there is such number  and such element 
 ,  that 
 
; 
 
 2) the class of strongly F-minimal system S, characterized by the fact that for any two elements 
 
 
 
at any       for all   
 
3) the class of -minimal systems S, characterized by the fact that 
; 
4) the class of -minimal systems S, characterized by the fact that for all 
  each relation  relation of equality on the set  
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3. Classes of cryptosystems 
 
For all  and   
 
 
 
by the equality         
 
The mapping   , (  let s call the algorithm - encryption, and mapping  
   algorithm   -decryption. 
 
Let s note, that such definition of algorithms of encryption and decryption enables in terms of polybasic algebraic 
system   to distinguish the following three levels of the notion key  
1) an element of the set   is interpreted as session or, otherwise, short-period  key; 
2) an element of the set  is interpreted as a key of average duration, that is as a key, used to define numbers of 
sessions; 
3) an element of the set   is interpreted as non-volatile key. 
 
time-invariant -cryptosystem  - as an ordered couple 
 
 
 
and time-invariant - cryptosystem ) - as an ordered couple 
 
 
 
(if such necessity arises), 
that is higher-priority: the processes of encryption and decryption. 
Let s show that in the terms of polybasic algebraic system main classes of cryptosystems can be presented. 
The time-invariant cryptosystem will be 
called: 
1) symmetric cryptosystem, if each  - a name of such bijection, that   a name of easily-fj 
computable bijection; 
2) nonsymmetrical, if each - a name of such bijection is at present not known quick algorithm of 
bijection computation  -  
3) cryptosystem with autokey, if   t4 M 2 T4 M 3,12  fictitious variable; 
4) 4) cryptosystem with outermost session key, if t4 M 2 T4 M 3,12  
       5)     parametric cryptosystem, if     essential parameter for  the system that is there 
are two such elements  that 
 
 
 
6) block cryptosystem, if 
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for all  
 
7) scheme with prehistory, if there is even one such couple of values 
 
 
that 
 
 
 
 
Let s distinguish the following subclass of schemes with prehistory, a subject of research of classical cryptography.  
The time-invariant -cryptosystem with prehistory   
will be called time-invariant flow cryptosystem, if there is such easily computable function 
 
                                                 (6) 
 
that for all  
 
 
 
where 
 
                                                                            (8) 
 
 
 
From (1) follows. 
Theorem 3. For any time-invariant flow cryptosystem  mapping 
  boundedly deterministic function. 
The following sample shows that modern cryptosystems are naturally fitted in the frames of the above constructed 
classification of cryptosystems.  
Sample 2. 1. Vernam cipher is a time-invariant non-parametric block cryptosystem with outermost session key. 
 2. Vigenere ciphers are time-invariant parametric cryptosystem with prehistory and autokey, besides a password 
plays a role of the parameter. 
 3. Ciphers DES, AES and GOST 28147-89 are time-invariant block parametric cryptosystems with outermost 
session key. For DES and GOST 28147-89 the parameter is setting of S-blocks, and for AES  setting of 
coefficients of polynomials. 
 4. Cipher RSA is a time-invariant block parametric cryptosystem with autokey, besides, a setting of natural 
numbers plays a role of the parameter. 
 5. Cipher RC4 is a time-invariant flow parametric cryptosystem with outermost session key, besides a parameter  
numbers permutation   
 6. Non-linear BPI- machine over finite ring [7, 8] is a time-invariant flow parametric cryptosystem with autokey, 
besides a parameter is a setting of coefficients of polynomials. 
 7. Any quantum cipher is a cryptosystem with prehistory. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In the work polybasic algebraic system S, intended to research modern cryptosystems from the same positions. The 
further deeper research of abstract properties of the algebraic system S is one of possible trends of the further 
researches. The second trend of researches is connected with detail working out of the introduced notion time-
invariant  - cryptosystem  in the work. The third trend of 
researches is connected with the construction and analysis within the framework of the algebraic system S of the 
formal model of unstable cryptosystem. The fourth trend of researches is connected with the development within the 
framework of the algebraic system S of formal models of passive and active attacks of a cryptoanalyst, sufficient for 
theoretical analysis from the same positions of their efficiency and complexity. The fifth trend of researches is 
connected with the development of data structure, sufficient for efficient computer modeling of attacks of a 
cryptoanalyst for cryptosystems, defined in the terms of algebraic system S. 
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